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‘Is it a donkey?’ Presences, senses and figuration 
       in human-technological border control 
by Perle Møhl 
 
In: The Biometric Border World: Technology, Bodies and Identities on the Move. Olwig, K. F., Grünen-
berg, K., Møhl, P. & Simonsen, A. (eds.). London & New York: Routledge, p. 100-114. 
 
 
Biometric technologies and ‘smart borders’ are generally associated with complex, high-
tech automated systems that control IDs on the basis of recognition (European 
Commission 2014; Sanchez del Rio et al. 2016), like the facial and threat recognition 
systems described in the previous chapter. Yet, as we shall see, simpler, often analogue 
technologies that merely detect bodily presences can be just as efficient, if not more so, 
in deterring supposed threats as identification and recognition technologies. Indeed, 
infrared cameras, radars, haptic sensors and sound detectors can identify the presence 
of a something or someone and qualify their kind, but without identifying them as 
individuals. They are place-oriented and can detect signs of life and other forms of 
presences, substances, heat emissions and sounds, and they can also to some extent 
qualify that presence. If they compare, they do so by detecting likenesses to known 
categories – is it a donkey, a bird, a human? – but not to known individuals. The links 
they establish are generally between a body and a place, and it is that link, that presence, 
that can define the body as a threat, an intrusion – a body in the wrong place. As some 
providers say, they perform ‘situational awareness’ (Dynetics n.d.). The selective 
intelligence work becomes to determine the quality of the presence, and if the presence 
is defined as a threat, to deter or apprehend the intruding body. 
This chapter describes and analyses the workings of a series of such biometric 
presence-detection technologies as they are used to control border-transgression 
attempts in Ceuta, Spain, by using different kinds of visual, sonar and haptic technologies 
that ‘see’, ‘listen’ and ‘feel’ to detect presences and hidden persons. The chapter further 
analyses these technological practices of border work and the subjects they produce by 
comparing them to a presence detection system used in Copenhagen Airport to monitor 
the flow of passengers-as-bodies. The employed technologies are all biometric in that 
‘Is it a donkey?’  Perle Møhl 
 2 
they measure and identify the qualities of bodies, but unlike technologies such as facial 
recognition, they mainly relate those qualities to spatial parameters and not to 
delocalized data or IDs. They also relate very differently to the body and the premises 
for life, as we shall see. It is these differences and their existential and semiotic or sense-
making qualities that I would like to dwell on in this chapter.  
Borrowing the term ‘situational awareness,’ kindly provided by detection-technology 
developers, the analysis will revolve around issues concerning enskilled senses, 
categorization, selectivity and the attaching of meaning to amorphous entities, 
discussing how a presence comes to constitute a threat, as well as the kinds of exchanges 
that take place around the border fence, framing border work as a crossfire of mutual 
scrutiny and surveillance. 
 
Presence detection, Ceuta 
Ceuta is a Spanish urban enclave in northern Morocco only 19.5 km2. It has been a 
European frontier outpost since the early fifteenth century and an important strategic and 
commercial site for guarding the entrance to the Mediterranean. Changing from 
Portuguese to Spanish rule in 1668, Ceuta became an essential element in Europe's and 
later Schengen’s external borders with Spain’s entry into the EU in 1986 (Gold 2000; 
Pallister-Wilkins 2017). The old city centre is cut off from the African mainland by an 
immense fortification lined by a sea-water channel dating back to the Phoenician period, 
and rebuilt by the Spanish in the seventeenth century to avert Moroccan and Portuguese 
attacks. It now stands as a monumental reminder of the enclave’s historically precarious 
and contested political position. 
Besides the amply bridged and mainly symbolic fortification, two borders today 
separate Ceuta from the rest of the world. To the north, the Strait of Gibraltar, with its 
strong winds and powerful currents, separates Ceuta from the Spanish mainland and 
European continent. The Strait acts as a ‘natural border’, being incorporated into the 
fortifications of Europe and Schengen tactics of deterrence. Migrants attempting to cross 
the Strait from Morocco must overcome the harsh and rapidly changing weather 
conditions and the immensely strong current, and their failure to do so often goes 
unacknowledged. These disappearances can be categorized as an act of natural forces 
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for which no political entity or authority can be held responsible. The Strait thus plays 
the same role as the Sonoran desert along the US-Mexican border, ridding immigration 
authorities of their responsibility for the deaths, and even sweeping away any evidence 
of a crime (De León 2015). The open Strait is narrow and easily surveyed, being patrolled 
by both Spanish and Moroccan coastguards. If intercepted by the latter, migrant vessels 
are returned to Morocco. Crossing the Strait by ferry from Ceuta to mainland Spain is 
another option, as we shall see. 
To the south, Ceuta is separated from Morocco and the rest of the African continent 
by an immense double fence lined with sensors and surveillance technologies. The 
fencing, initiated in the early 1990s with small, relatively symbolic barbed-wire fences, 
has today developed into a colossus of steel poles, metal grids, watchtowers, concrete, 
sewer systems and razor wire (see also Andersson 2016; Pallister-Wilkins 2017; Saddiki 
2017). However, despite its impressive aspect and perpetual reinforcement, sustained 
by ostensibly ever more proficient technologies, the fence is regularly scaled and jumped 
by huge groups of migrants. As the border guards themselves say, it is only a question of 
time before it collapses, either physically or symbolically. It is in fact the immensity of 
the fence and its technological ‘hardwiring’ that, as Ruben Andersson has noted, has 
triggered the advent of these massive assaults, since ‘a critical mass’ is now needed to 
climb it (Andersson 2016). 
Both the sea border and the fence are augmented by surveillance technologies. In 
both border zones, long-range visual and infrared (IR) cameras and radars detect 
presences at a distance in the upland and sea, whereas different types of haptic sensors 
are used to detect presences up close. One is the string of haptic sensors built into the 
fence structure itself, or even skilfully twisted into and hidden in the razor wire. Another 
type of sensor are the mobile presence detectors that police and border guards take with 
them when they inspect trucks and containers leaving for the mainland by ferry. 
In this particular location, the technologies are thus mainly used to detect unwanted 
presences, defined as threats. And threatening presences, in this border context, are 
constituted by two main categories: ‘irregular migrants’ and stowaways. ‘Irregular 
migrants’ are constituted by persons trying to enter Ceuta from Morocco, either by 
climbing the fence (by far the largest group, primarily Sub-Saharan migrants and, to a 
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lesser extent, North African, Middle Eastern and Asian groups1) or the much more 
expensive option of getting a ride by ski jet. ‘Stowaways’ are those who are hidden within 
cars passing through the land border crossing, at Tarajal II. They come mostly from the 
richer Sub-Saharan countries, since this is an expensive option or, as we shall see below, 
in trucks headed for mainland Spain by ferry, an option used mainly by Moroccan 
citizens. In this chapter, however, I am interested not so much in the actual origins of 
the different groups and persons who attempt to make it across the border as in how they 
appear as signs and are read, interpreted and categorized by the border guards in 
conjunction with presence detection technologies. And, inverting the perspective, I am 
interested in how particular migrants develop their own technologies and skills in order 
to read, interpret and circumvent the border and its deterrence modalities. 
Beating hearts 
‘Whenever a truck is getting ready to leave Ceuta, border guards sometimes move in to 
inspect the loads and containers with their presence-detection gear’, Guardia Civil 
Officer Fernando tells me as we ride through the harbour area on a routine patrol in his 
green-and-white Guardia Civil SUV. ‘The detection gear’, he explains, ‘is composed of 
a sensor, similar to a huge microphone, that can be attached to the outside of a container 
or a truck. The sensor is extremely sensitive to pressure, so it can detect the sound of a 
pounding human heart’. The system, I learn later, is regulated to filter away ‘noise’, that 
is, sounds and other pressure waves that do not correspond to the physiology of a beating 
human heart and its particular timbre and rhythm, like those produced by motors, the 
weather and other animals. Another system enables the officers to detect the sound and 
the particular rhythms of human breathing. Heartbeat and breathing are, as the 
technology developers say, ‘vital signs … which cannot be concealed’ (Kurihara and 
Watanabe 2011). In other words, the technology relies on the fact that one cannot 
control – that is, stop – the beating of one’s heart or one’s breathing without annulling 
the premises for life itself. 
‘Hiding as stowaways in trucks going to mainland Spain is a popular method for illegal 
migrants trying to cross the Strait of Gibraltar’, Fernando explains. A carnival is visiting, 
and in a couple of weeks the attractions will be dismantled and the trucks will get ready 
to board the ferry to go back to the mainland. ‘The police and Guardia Civil have been 
The Biometric Border World                                                        Part II – On the Border 
 
 5 
carrying out a border guarding operation, Operación Fin de Feria, for some years at the 
end of the carnival. Last year they had pretty good results’, Fernando says, ‘catching 
several illegal migrants with their presence-detection gear. In the back of a truck, the 
sensors had identified the signs of a beating heart – and then another – and another. 
Using their dogs to smell the exact locations of the intruders, the officers crawled into 
the truck and extracted several adult men who were hiding, twisted around the elements 
of the carnival attraction like contortionists’, as Fernando pictures it. The owners of the 
carnival attractions were suspected of trafficking but were later released, claiming they 
had no idea they were carrying stowaways and that the migrants must have hidden in 
the trucks during the night. The prospective migrants were all Moroccans who had 
legally entered Ceuta on a day-pass that did not allow them to travel on to mainland 
Spain. Their hearts and their breathing had betrayed them. 
 
 
Figure 1. Screen of heartbeat detector (© photo by the author) 
 
The presence sensor functions like a gigantic ear, glued to the surface of the truck. 
The movement of its membrane – picking up vibrations, filtering them and transforming 
them into signs of life – simulates the movement of a listening human tympana, simply 
bigger and more fine-tuned. The agent using the sensor has a screen and a loudspeaker 
at his disposal, so he can see the vibrations from several human sources, transformed 
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into visual signals, and also hear them if he wants to. Each of the different hearts shows 
up as a graph on the screen, showing every heart beat as a peak. From the analysed 
signals, defined as human or as interferences, the agent directs the search for the 
stowaways’ bodies and their incriminating hearts. 
So, like fingerprint scanners (see Part III) or the facial recognition technologies 
discussed in Chapter 3, the heartbeat sensors work on the basis of iconic sign relations, 
searching for likenesses between an object – the rhythm and timbre of a beating heart in 
a stowaway body – and the registered and stored templates of known human heart beats. 
That is how the filter recognizes a human presence. But contrary to fingerprint and facial-
recognition technologies, the presence detectors can hardly be circumvented, and the 
likenesses cannot be dodged (see Chapter 3). One cannot make one’s human heart 
sound like a dog’s heart, nor a motor. There is indeed something of Giorgio Agamben’s 
well-trodden ‘bare life’ at play here – a bare human heartbeat, unalterable, 
uncontrollable – or of the unescapable belonging to a single category, the ontological 
collective that is the human species subordinating all other categorizations, all other 
profiles, to what is culturally constructed (Rapport 2017: 6). Only the human beating 
heart is the matter. 
The sensor defines an intrusion by coupling it to a particular place, always a place 
not intended for human presence. It is indeed the hiddenness, the ‘stowed-awayness’, 
that defines the presence as a threat, as a body that requires interception, and not the 
identification of a particular individual. In semiotic terms, we could say that it is the 
direct, indexical connection between the sensor and the beating heart that provides the 
sign, the evidence of a presence, and the place that defines the presence as illegal and a 
threat. 
Fernando shows me photos of migrants whom he and his colleagues have found 
hidden in car seats or bumpers, or wrapped around motors. Every photo seems to attest, 
in his eyes, the efficiency of the sensors, but also the ruses and desperation of the 
migrants. 
The heartbeat detector can only be used in confined spaces, such as trucks, containers 
and cars, where the resonances of the sounds are not jumbled by interference. Its ruthless 
accuracy, rendering almost superfluous any human intervention, any interpretation of 
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the signals by a border guard, cannot, for the time being, be applied to open spaces and 
longer distances. But other types of presence detector, haptic, visual and thermal, can 
be used in the open, as we shall see next. 
Fence haptics and other techno-sensory engagements 
Along the border separating Ceuta from Morocco runs the 8.5 km long, six-meter-high 
double fence armed with razor wire and a string of watch towers, floodlights, daylight  
 
 
Figure 2. Patrolling the border fence with the Guardia Civil, Ceuta (© photo by the author) 
 
and infrared surveillance cameras and haptic sensors, complemented by mobile infrared 
cameras mounted on the SUVs that regularly patrol the border at night. The fence cuts 
through the undulating landscape like a saw-toothed knife, running through deserted 
gorges and valleys, and between houses and gardens where animals stray and children 
play on each side, stretching into the sea at each extremity, over beaches where tourists 
sunbathe and swim. All along its sinuous body, the string of surveillance devices clearly 
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indicates that at the end of the connection someone or something is alert and watching. 
In the COS – Centro Operativo de Servicios – above the Tarajal border crossing, 
Isabel, a senior Guardia Civil officer, is surveying her screens. On her desk she has a row 
of smaller screens, and on the wall in front of her four large screens each depict four 
images from the more than sixty daylight cameras along the border fence and its sewers. 
The images automatically shift to new cameras every fifteen seconds or so. A mechanical 
voice issues an alert whenever the haptic sensors detect movement along the fence. On 
one of the screens we can see two men repairing a big hole in the fence, made by a 
group of migrants attempting to cross into Ceuta early in the morning. They only made 
it through the first fence, being intercepted at the second fence by Isabel’s colleagues 
and returned to Morocco. Because of the repairmen’s work on the fence, the voice 
repeatedly alerts Isabel of an unknown presence in section G / camera 19, and the 
corresponding camera image stays on. It is distracting, and Isabel would like to turn the 
alert system off. ‘But I can’t’, she explains, ‘in case someone tries something somewhere 
else.’ She looks at the screens as the images from the sixty-odd cameras continually shift 
and move our attention to new sites along the fence. I cannot make out where they are 
pointing, but Isabel knows exactly where she is. She knows the landscape by heart, 
moving through it via the surveillance cameras, she says.  
Isabel can also turn the cameras around and scan the landscape with a joystick. They 
don’t scan automatically – that would be a nuisance, she says. The cameras don’t know 
where to look or what to target, and it would be a mess if the images were moving all 
the time. They can’t distinguish important from unimportant, sense from nonsense. 
The alerts from the haptic sensors are often triggered by stray donkeys, dogs, large 
birds, deer and horses passing by the fence, and Isabel just saw something that looked 
like an ibis, only smaller. She has become quite skilled in animal biology, she says, 
sitting here for long hours, distinguishing the living from the inert, humans from non-
humans. 
A few of the images don’t shift. The cameras are pointed at the big sewer holes in the 
fence’s foundations that prevent the whole construction from collapsing during heavy 
rains. The sewers are the fragile points in the fence, she explains, because they are so 
big. A person could easily walk through them upright. 
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At another work station, two screens show images from IR cameras that are used at 
night to detect body heat. On one of them, humidity completely covers the lens. But 
when night falls, patrols will move along the fence with mobile IR cameras mounted on 
tall poles. The fixed cameras, as well as those mounted on the patrol cars, are pointed 
into Moroccan territory. ‘When a group of people arrives at the fence, it’s already too 
late for us to react’, Isabel explains. ‘When they touch the fence, they’re already climbing 
it’. 
So the cameras, which point into Moroccan territory day and night, and the images 
they display on Isabel’s and her colleagues’ big screens, seem to be the pivotal tool. But 
the cameras can’t see – they need human operators to make the distinctions between 
humans and donkeys, between local residents and migrants, between the anodyne and 
the threat. 
Isabel’s colleague talks about a border guard who worked in the COS some years 
back. He mainly took night shifts, surveying the screens of the infrared cameras. After a 
while in the service he could tell the difference between a Maghrebi and a sub-Saharan. 
I ask them how he could see that from something as indistinct as an infrared image, just 
a white figure against a dark background. ‘He could see it in the shape, the posture, the 
way of moving and walking, and the clothing.’ This was not something he had learned 
in a training program but was of the order of tacit knowledge, even if his colleagues 
could recognize and describe it. ‘He had a special gift…’, Isabel’s colleague concludes. 
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Figure 3. Developing zoological skills with the IR surveillance camera 
(© photo by the author) 
 
The COS is the central nervous system of an infrastructural installation consisting of 
the fence and its sewers, watchtowers and hinterland, hooked up to the COS through a 
sensory network that can feel the presence of bodies, sense their body heat at a distance, 
and see them as they move and close in on the structure. At the end of the electric 
nervous system, in front of the screens, human perceptions and interpretations take over 
the sensory work, attributing meaning to these technical sensations. The figure of the 
cyborg comes to mind, for the operators in front of their screens form an integral part of 
this sensory system, manipulating the joystick, switching between images, picking up 
the alerts of the haptic sensors, scrutinizing the images for details, interpreting all these 
inputs and, on some occasions, giving orders to mobile units to move out to spots of 
intrusion. 
 
A cross-fire of surveillance and technological enskilment 
The officers in the COS and on patrol along the fence use high-tech presence-detection 
devices to survey the border zone up close and at a distance, but they are not the only 
ones on guard. Indeed, as had happened this morning, large groups of Sub-Saharan 
migrants regularly attempt to cross the fence, sometimes successfully. They have been 
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lying low in the surrounding Moroccan mountains scrutinizing the fence, the 
technologies and the routines of the border guards, becoming techno-specialists in their 
own right. While waiting to work with the Guardia Civil officers in the COS and on 
patrol, I have been discussing the border technologies with a group of men who 
managed to cross the fence in February 2017. They seem to know the border zone and 
the fence, with all its devices, capabilities and failings, as well as or even better than the 
border guards, for the border has been their focal point for many months, their main 
preoccupation 24/7. Most of them had tried to scale the fence several times before 
actually succeeding one early February morning. So they know the fence from close 
personal acquaintance, they have been cut and snared by it, trapped, deterred and 
severely wounded, and the signs on their bodies show it. They have an intimate and 
wretchedly embodied, even haptic knowledge of its materiality. 
‘Frappe 358’, they call their last and final attempt: ‘Hit 358’. Like all the other ‘hits’, 
it is named after the number of people who managed to cross. And they have all defeated 
it and can talk about their technological knowledge and skills with pride. One of them, 
François, gives me details about the fence, the number and type of cameras installed, 
the routines of the patrols and the watchtower manning on both sides of the border. Over 
the weeks, he also talks to me about how the migrants organized themselves in the 
mountains and the many months they spent surveying the fence. I come to learn about 
the fights between the migrants, the changes in leadership, the regular coups d’état 
where the leaders and most of their ‘government’, as they called it, were overthrown, 
the conflicts and alliances between national groups, the fate of snitches, and the logistics 
and preparation of the ‘hits’. Without him telling me, I sense he is part of the leadership, 
as indicated by the way the others still relate to him. And he confirms that, although the 
organigram is no longer officially on display because those in leading positions would 
be charged as traffickers and held responsible for the damage to the fence and the border 
guards, the internal hierarchy will endure even as time goes by and the surveillance will 
continue from within Ceuta. He has clearly played a leading role in the organization and 
tells me about their intelligence service, their border work. They surveyed the border 
with binoculars and even, at some point, a night vision monocular, and they were in 
constant touch via mobile phones.2 They could track the movements of patrols, detect 
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their routines, count their numbers and keep track of their schedules, nights, days, 
weekdays, weekends and holidays. And over the months, they would get an idea of the 
Guardia Civil’s technologies, how they used them and when they failed to work 
properly, that is, in heavy rain, fog, strong wind, smoke or strong sunlight. They singled 
out the infrared cameras that weren’t working and noted when they were undergoing 
maintenance. They figured out how topography and weather played a part, when it was 
to their advantage, the fragile areas, and when and where to ‘hit’ by surprise. And one 
early morning they moved in on the border in one of those fragile zones where the 
technologies were failing and patrol access was difficult. They lay low on a mountain 
slope for 24 hours, covered only by low bushes while the Moroccan forces unknowingly 
changed shifts in the nearby watchtower. And when the time came, all 358 men rose 
out of the bushes, stormed the fence and managed to cross it and run all the way to the 
CETI before anyone noticed. 
They continue to survey the fence from the other side. The CETI (Centro de Estancia 
Temporal Inmigrantes), where they are lodged while waiting for their expulsion order – 
paradoxically executed by giving them a laissez-passer and a ferry ticket to the Spanish 
mainland – was only designed to hold 512 migrants, but was accommodating 1100 at 
the time of my fieldwork. They know that when a new group manages to break through 
the fence an equal number of CETI residents will be sent across the Strait.3 Without saying 
much more, I understand that they also engage in digital communications and 
intelligence networks across the fence and that those exchanges also play their part in 
the border work, just like the agreements between Spanish and Moroccan police and 
border guard agencies. 
After the ‘hit’ in the morning, the Spanish Minister of the Interior announces that the 
border in Ceuta will be made más inteligente, that is, ‘smarter’. Drones will be set in to 
patrol the border, also providing surveillance of the most inaccessible areas where most 
of the ‘hits’ take place. Fernando and his colleagues roll their eyes. They know very well 
that there are ‘dark spots’ that are difficult to survey and patrol, that the migrants have 
the upper hand because they can choose the time and place and take the border guards 
by surprise, and that they will always come and cannot be stopped. And they also know 
from first-hand experience that technology is not the answer. They acknowledge that the 
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migrants have good reasons for wanting to move into Europe and that the solutions are 
rather of a political and economic order, as well as being on a much higher level, out of 
their hands. They seem quite disillusioned. As for the drones, ‘Who is going to fly them? 
And who is even going to look at the images and interpret them?!’ There are already only 
very few people on duty every night to patrol the fence and survey the screens in the 
COS and, Fernando adds, the things won’t even be able to fly in the narrow gorges of 
the border: ‘This is Gibraltar; the winds are far too strong, they will crash into the 
mountain walls within minutes!’ Some months later the minister rolls back his proposal 
to purchase drones for border control in Ceuta. 
 
Reading signs, detecting threats 
In all these border control settings, visual, aural and haptic presence-detection devices 
register and measure bodily qualities and detect bodily presences. Coupled with human 
interpretative skills, and sometimes even special ‘gifts’, it becomes possible to define 
their kind. The technologies range from complicated seismic devices with digital filtering 
and infrared detection of body heat to tactical communications and direct visual 
inspection and analysis. In all cases, the presences detected make sense as threats 
because of their spatial positions, the locations in which they are situated, whether hearts 
pounding in a container or bodies moving in on a fence. The categorizations and profiles 
are made on the basis of assumptions vested in these localized bodies about their past 
and future moves, not on their identities and on previously registered data. On the 
screens, the bodies show up as simple graphs, dots or vague outlines, signs that need to 
be interpreted and given content for action to be taken. Is it a dog, an ibis, a human? Is 
it a threat? For in the end, border control is all about reading signs, whether the 
interpretation is done by an algorithm, a device, a human or, as most often, a 
combination of these. 
 
Presence detection, Copenhagen Airport: the surveyors surveyed 
Presence detection is also used in other settings where the vague figures take on other 
meanings because they are inscribed in other spatial, political and economic 
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configurations. To both broaden and sharpen the analysis of the interpretive work of 
presence detection and to understand how vague contours take on meaning depending 
on their contextual organizational and political configurations, a final example will be 
presented briefly. In this example, the dots also constitute bodies in movement near a 
border, but the objects of control are not the bodies themselves, but the system impeding 
their movement. In this case, the object of control is itself a border police unit, creating 
queues and obstructing flows in an international airport. The example serves to turn 
around the perspective of figuration and control once again in order to further our 
understanding of the scope, functioning and semiotic qualities of these types of biometric 
surveillance technologies and of the particular kinds of ‘situational awareness’ and 
threats with which they work. 
 
Figure 4. Flow detection, Copenhagen Airport (© photo by the author) 
 
In the main working space of the Border Police in Copenhagen Airport, a big 
screen on the wall shows a black and white still-image of the floor in the border 
area. The inert image becomes animated when a person moves into the zone. 
‘3D people-tracking sensors’ installed in the ceiling of the border zone detect 
the human presence, and a small white dot starts moving across the image on 
the screen. If the person queues up at the manual passport control, the dot 
turns bright red. If the person slows down in front of the Automated Border 
Control, the dot turns blue. If all goes well, all the white dots remain white, 
meaning they are in movement, only momentarily halted by the border 
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control.  
At present, the many red dots have turned into a big glowing red blob on 
the screen, indicating that too many people are queuing in the passport 
control instead of reaching their flights or lingering in the shopping areas. But 
in the police office no one looks at the screen except for the anthropologist, 
who is fascinated by the aesthetics of the imagery, the small moving dots that 
change colour, and the fact that the border guards are themselves being 
monitored and controlled. The border guards, on the other hand, don’t look 
at the screen. They know perfectly well when people are crowding: they can 
hear it through the thin walls, sense the bustle and see it from their service 
center, the ‘aquarium’ that overlooks the border zone. 
However, although the police officers no longer notice the screen, the red and blue dots 
are certainly seen, registered and audited in the offices of CPH Airport A/S, the private 
company running the airport. And they will use the figures in their next negotiations with 
police management and Frontex about increasing flow and reducing retention on the 
Schengen border by lowering the settings of the threshold of resemblance in the ABC 
(see Møhl 2018). 
The bodies registered by the tracking devices in the airport are anonymous, like the 
migrants trying to move in on the fence or across the strait. Their identities are not 
important. They are, until proven otherwise, devoid of anything other than potentiality, 
posing different kinds of possibilities and threats. But threats come in many forms, and 
here the bodies, rising not out of the bushes but in the lack of flow, directly threaten 
commercial interests. The border police wish to fulfil their obligation to protect the 
border against what are defined as threats to national and European interests, whereas 
CPH Airport A/S wishes to have more active consumers in the shopping areas, even at 
the cost of lowering vigilance. These two threat images and their respective agendas 
clash. The question, though, is whether the motivations for guarding the borders of Ceuta 
and Europe are in fact so different, and whether economic agendas do not also play just 
as decisive a role in the overall policies of erecting border infrastructures and investing 
in ever more proficient technologies. This is suggested by several analyses of borders 
and migration deterrence as sites of industry, economic investment and spectacle (e.g. 
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Andersson 2016; Andersson 2014; De Genova 2013; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen 
2013). In these different presence-detection systems, travelers, migrants and border 
guards all become objects of policy (Feldman 2013): different types of policies, different 
agendas, yet all part of the flow and management of the Border World. 
Situational awareness and the nature of blankness 
This chapter has raised several questions concerning the semiotic and political processes 
involved in characterizing seemingly void figures and the nature of a presence. How 
does one attribute meaning to a white, anonymous dot or figure? How does one learn to 
see and read them, vest them with intentions and see them as threats? What are the 
categorizations and selectivities involved, when do they operate on an individual basis 
and when are they collectively enskilled and formatted? 
First, the presences that appear as heartbeat signals and white or red figures on screens 
are simply biological presences, devoid of personal identity, devoid of any individual 
characteristics. In terms of biometric identification, they are ‘data blanks’, ‘whats’ not 
‘whos’ (Feldman 2013; Rapport 2013). In Michel Serres’ terms, we could call them 
‘white multiplicity’, ‘blank figures’ that could be vested with any identity, any scenario 
about the past and the future (Hetherington and Lee 2000; Svendsen 2011). The ‘blank 
figure’ seems to relate quite well to these anonymous dots on the screen, stripping the 
moving bodies of all predetermination. Every dot is possibly an anyone, a ‘cosmopolitan 
anyone’ (Rapport 2017) – but in an ideal world, then, one without borders. For the 
anonymous and unidentified dots are mobile and vectorized: they have a direction and 
a presumable goal in the eyes of the border guards. In that sense, they already have a 
story. 
On the nature of blankness and writing about the painter’s white canvas, Deleuze 
holds that it is anything but blank. ‘It is a mistake to think that the painter works on a 
white surface. … [E]verything he has in his head or around him is already in the canvas, 
more or less virtually, more or less actually, before he begins his work’ (Deleuze 2003: 
71). In the same manner, he says, the ‘blank page’ is already full before we start writing.  
In other words, the slate, canvas or figure is never blank, rasa; in our perception it is 
already saturated with stories and images, possible pasts and futures, from a variety of 
sources. The painting is made not by the painter in an artistic void, but in an interplay 
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between the artist’s body, senses and intentionality, and complex, shifting political, 
ideological, aesthetic and economic forces. Deleuze uses the painter’s work and white 
canvas as a means to think about society and politics, as well about sensations and 
meaning. Following this allegory, the border guards’ sensory work takes place within 
particular political and technological settings. More concretely, as we saw in Chapter 3, 
their senses are enskilled and formatted not only in isolation, but in a particular 
community of practice (Grasseni 2007; 2011) – and, we might add, in an interplay with 
the technologies that form and are formed by human perceptions and agendas. The white 
dots on Isabel’s screen, then, do not simply constitute Michel Serres’ blank figures, but 
are already vested with meaning, with significance and presumed goals, because they 
are localized and vectorized. For example, unidentified threats present unspecified 
enemies. A donkey, a Moroccan and a Sub-Saharan are all living bodies, all white 
figures, but with very different political and practical meanings and immediate 
consequences for border control. 
The unidentified presences that move about Copenhagen Airport and queue in front 
of the border control, forming big colourful blobs, are not blank either, even if they are 
merchandized as ‘anonymous’ (XOVIS AG 2019). To the XOVIS system and its tentacles, 
they have the identity of potential consumer bodies. And when they are transformed into 
blobs they constitute dense signs of occlusion and lack of flow. They are figures played 
out in the negotiations between private and public interests: between the airport’s desire 
to create a seamless experience of pleasure and consumption and the authorities’ need 
to control identities. And, like the TIP images described in Chapter 3, they are converted 
into numbers and used for negotiations when the border control agency and the 
individual border guards’ productivity are audited at the end of the month. Analysing 
their particular and somewhat simplistic mercantile and auditing semantics clearly 
points to the semantic density of seemingly blank figures that could be vested with any 
story but that usually have a quite clear – here, commercial – story, written directly into 
both the technologies and the policies surrounding their installation. 
Zooming in on the very minute daily interactions between technologies and bodies, 
both surveyed and surveying, enables us to understand more about the sensory activities 
that lie at the basis of every human activity, including border work, the fine balance 
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between technological detection and human interpretation, and how different bodies 
are constituted as more than neutral objects and come to stand as threats. It also puts 
into perspective some illusions we might have about the efficiencies of the technologies 
in use and sheds light on the discrepancy between political narratives about the 
character of the threats and the infrastructural means to deter them on the one hand, and 
the sensations and experiences of those who engage in border work on a daily basis – 
who meet the ‘threats’ in the form of real human beings and go about their tasks, often 
without much illusion about their utility – on the other. Inverting the perspective paints 
a larger picture that includes both internal ambiguities and mutual awarenesses and 
draws a more nuanced picture of what separates and what unites people on both sides 
of the border, both in their daily tactics and in their technological-sensory work. 
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NOTES 
1 During my fieldwork in 2017, an average of 1100 individuals were staying in the Centro de 
Estancia Temporal Inmigrantes (CETI), waiting to have their cases processed; a total of 2244 
‘irregular migrants’ entered Ceuta that year (El Faro de Ceuta 2018). The great majority, 
approximately 70%, were Sub-Saharan men who had entered by jumping the fence and who were 
not requesting asylum, plus just a handful of women who had passed the border as stowaways in 
cars or on jet skis. The rest were mostly Algerian, Syrian and Sri Lankan men.  
2 Another young man describes how, before jumping the wall, they burned all their cell phones to 
avoid tracing and police intelligence work. In a similar vein, Ruben Andersson describes the tactics 
of migrants using GPS and compasses and throwing them overboard before arriving in the Canaries 
so not to be seen as captains and traffickers (Andersson 2010: 37). 
3 Once arrived, they are placed in temporary centers for a maximum of three months, after which 
they are required to return to their countries of origin. Complying with the expulsion order was, 
however, not part of the plan of any of the persons I discussed this with. 
                                            
